The multi-agent-systems paradigm is becoming more and more popular as a basis for realizing net-based solutions. This development is accompanied by an increasing relevance of security issues. For instance, the potential loss of privacy and other assets is a major concern for, both merchants and customers, in Internet-based commerce and, without being properly addressed, such very legitimate concerns hamper the growth of e-commerce.
Introduction
In parallel to the evolution of computer architectures from main frames over client-server architectures to open system architectures, we observe an evolution in programming methodologies from structured programming over object-oriented programming to agent-oriented programming. The development of new capabilities and new paradigms for computing and for communicating is accompanied by an evolution of threats to our information systems and this creates an increasing demand for, and also on, security mechanisms. In early computing systems, physical controls were a sufficiently effective means for protecting data and software from unauthorized access because these systems could be physically isolated. Multiuser-programming created a need for mechanisms to logically control the sharing of hardware, programs, and other data among a community of users. The move to networked information systems exacerbated these problems, providing not only remote access for users and programs, but also creating possibilities for attacks from anywhere in the world. At this point in time, it seems that the development of computing and communication features has outpaced the ability to secure their manifold applications in information systems. Requirements for confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and access control have become more differentiated, but the ability to meet these requirements apparently has not kept up.
In particular, the growth of Internet-based commerce is hampered by legitimate concerns over the security of the information systems involved. One of the major concerns for both merchants and customers participating in ecommerce is the potential for loss of privacy and other assets due to breaches in the security of corporate computer systems. Confidentiality and integrity of data is endangered by malicious users and programs trying to extract or to manipulate critical information. Securing a multi-agent-based e-commerce system involves several, orthogonal aspects: Open communication lines must be protected against eavesdropping and the unauthorized modification of messages by applying cryptographic algorithms and security protocols. The access to data and other resources must be restricted to authorized users and agents. Finally, one must control the propagation of critical information after it has been legitimately accessed by an agent. The latter aspect is the focus of this article, i.e., we demonstrate how to ensure secure information flow inside an agent program and, on a larger scale, inside an agent society.
Starting with Goguen and Meseguer's work on noninterference [8, 9] , restrictions on the flow of information have been formalized as independence properties between actions and observations. For deterministic systems, an agent A is noninterfering with an agent B if B's observations are independent of A's actions. In other words, no matter which actions A chooses, he cannot cause the observations of B to change and, hence, there is no danger that A might leak any secrets to B. For non-deterministic systems, the intuition works backwards: A is possibilistically non-interfering with B if the observations of B can be explained by so many different behaviors of A that B's observations do not reveal which actions A has chosen. Based on this intuition, a variety of possibilistic information flow properties has been proposed that can be used for formalizing security requirements (see, for example, [4, 6, 10, 18, 23, 25, 34, 42, 45, 47] ). For many of these properties, compositionality results have been derived that allow one to conclude the security of a composed system in a bottom-up fashion from the security of the system's components. When analyzing the security of information systems in a top-down fashion, an additional step is needed. One needs to identify local security requirements for the individual components such that, after a successful completion of the local analysis of each component, a compositionality result can be applied to derive the desired global guarantee. This is the problem that we address in this article.
The first main contribution of this article is a methodology for decomposing security requirements for a multi-agent system into local security requirements for the individual agents. Given a set of secrets, we categorize each agent as being either a friend or an observer. The intuition is that only friends may obtain information about the secrets and that all attackers in a given scenario have to belong to the observer category. The objective of this decomposition step is to split off a subsystem, i.e., the system of observers, for which the security analysis is straightforward-given that none of the friends leaks secret information to the observers. For decomposing the security requirement for the friend subsystem in a second step, we label each action with confidential, public, or 'don't care'. All actions that directly depend on the given secrets must be labeled confidential, all actions for interacting with the observer subsystem must be labeled public, and the labeling of the remaining actions can be freely chosen. This allows us to reduce the problem of decomposing the security requirement for the entire friend subsystem to the problem of finding an appropriate local labeling for each friend. In the local analysis of a friend, it remains to prove that occurrences of public actions do not depend on prior occurrences of confidential actions. At both decomposition steps, our methodology ensures that, after a successful analysis of the subsystems, a compositionality result can be applied to conclude the desired security guarantee for the composed system.
Our second main contribution, is a case study in which we illustrate the entire process of formally defining and analyzing the security of a multi-agent system that realizes a virtual mall. In the virtual mall, customers and merchants are represented by agents that operate on their behalf. Customers provide their agents with a description of the desired goods and a list of attributes for evaluating and comparing the offers that they receive from the merchants' agents. Customer agents may start a negotiation with the merchant agents and eventually either report a list of offers, ordered by the attributes, together with the corresponding addresses to their owners or buy the goods directly. Manifold security requirements arise in such a scenario. For instance, customers would like to keep confidential the maximum price that they are willing to pay for given goods because knowledge of this information could be exploited by merchants during negotiations to maximize their profit. For similar reasons, merchants want to keep confidential the minimum price at which they are willing to sell. It's also in the merchants' interest, for instance, that customers cannot deny having made the buy requests that the merchants receive, i.e., the non-repudiability of buy requests, while customers want to be sure that buy request in their name cannot be faked by others. An owner of a virtual mall, for example, wants to ensure that the trading environment is fair in a sense that is attractive to, both customers and merchants.
In our case study, we select one security requirement as a running example and demonstrate how it can be formalized with a possibilistic security property. We then apply our decomposition methodology to reduce the security requirement for the entire virtual mall in two steps to a set of local requirements for the individual agents, i.e., the friends. To simplify the verification of the resulting local security requirements, we apply the so called unwinding technique. After the successful completion of the local analysis, we apply a compositionality result (whose applicability is ensured by our decomposition methodology) to prove that the entire multi-agent system satisfies the given global security requirement.
We use the Modular Assembly Kit for Security Properties (brief: MAKS), a framework for possibilistic information flow security previously proposed by one of the authors [18, 22] , as the formal basis of our investigations. Using the MAKS allows us to simplify the analysis by re-using compositionality results [21] and unwinding theorems [19] that were previously derived in this framework. Moreover, the so called concept of views in the MAKS provides the basis for the labeling of actions in the second step of our decomposition methodology. We suspect that our decomposition methodology could be adopted also to other frameworks for possibilistic information flow security (such as, for instance, [6, 25, 34, 47] ), but this is beyond the scope of the current article.
We start our investigations in Section 2 with the modeling of multi-agent systems consisting of various agents and a common platform with state-event systems. Section 3 gives an introduction to the framework of possibilistic information flow security and illustrates how we formalize security requirements of multi-agent systems within this framework. Section 4 introduces techniques for decomposing these global security requirements to local requirements on individual agents. Formal verification techniques for establishing these local requirements are presented and illustrated in Section 5. We put our approach into perspective with related work in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes our main findings and gives an outlook on some research questions for the future.
Functional agent modeling
We demonstrate the process of defining and analyzing the security requirements of multi-agent systems in a comparison-shopping scenario. More specifically, we consider trading in a virtual mall that is realized by a multiagent system. Suppose a customer would like to find an offer for specific goods like, for instance, some software program or some book, at the cheapest available price or at the shortest available time of delivery. This customer could make use of the mall in the following way:
(1) The customer dispatches an agent with a description of the desired product and the attributes according to which different offers shall be compared. (2) The customer agent contacts a matchmaker to obtain information about merchants in the virtual mall. Merchants in the virtual mall are also represented by agents that are appropriately instantiated and the matchmaker is a service agent that simplifies searching for the relevant merchants. (3) The customer agent contacts the agents of all merchants advertised by the matchmaker and inquires about the desired product. The merchant agents may submit an offer in return, specifying price, delivery costs, delivery time etc. (4) Based on the replies by the merchant agents, the customer agent either reports its findings ranked according to the given preferences (e.g. a sorted list of offers with the addresses of the corresponding merchants) to its owner or it buys the goods directly from the merchant who made the best offer.
In order to formally analyze the security requirements in a virtual mall, we need a concrete formal specification of an example system. We specify each agent by a component specification and the entire mall as the composition of these components in order to reflect the modular architecture of a multi-agent system. We instantiate a generic interface specification of agents with the behavior specific to customer agents and merchant agents, respectively. For simplicity, we abstract from the matchmaker and other services that the virtual mall might offer. Our focus is on the trading between customer agents and merchant agents, and, for brevity, we refer to customer agents and merchant agents, respectively, also by customer and merchant in the following. We specify the communication between the various agents in a designated component specification, the platform. As this component shall capture all aspects of communication between the agents, we have to demand that communication between agents can only occur via the platform. There are manifold ways to realize the platform in an implementation. For instance, if communication is implemented using operating-system-level channels (like, e.g., pipes in UNIX) then this part of the operating system corresponds to our platform specification. If communication is implemented using communication protocols then the implementation of sockets and of the relevant part of the TCP/IP stack corresponds to the platform. A realization of the platform could also include other parts of the run-time environment (like, e.g., a Java platform) or application-level components.
In our functional specification of the virtual mall, we strive for simplicity while capturing the essential aspects of such a system. For instance, we abstract from the implementation details of a platform and disregard aspects of belief and intention that trigger an agent's behavior. Our case study is meant as a template for the security analysis of multi-agent-based virtual malls and other multi-agent systems. For analyzing the security of a real system, one would have to refine the functional specification accordingly. Refining the functional specification might invalidate some analysis results, which makes it necessary to re-do those parts of the analysis that are affected by the refinement. In the following we separate those parts of the analysis that are specific to the chosen scenario of comparison shopping from the more general parts that might be also applicable to other multi-agent systems. To this end, we precede the numbers of definitions and lemmata that are specific to the comparison-shopping scenario with 'Ex'. These parts of the analysis would have to be re-done after a refinement.
System model and specification language
We use an event-based model for capturing the interface and the behavior of the individual agents, the platform, and the entire virtual mall. As usual, events correspond to actions that cause a transition from one system state to another.
Definition 1 (State-event system).
A state-event system SES = (E, I, O, S, s 0 , T ) is a tuple, where E is the set of events, I ⊆ E and O ⊆ E are the sets of input events and output events, respectively, S is the set of states, s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, and T ⊆ S × E × S is the transition relation. We require I and O to be disjoint and T to be the graph of a partial function from S × E to S.
A state-event system is deterministic in the sense that the transition relation T is a partial function S × E → S. That is, for a given state s and a given event e, there is at most one successor state s . Nevertheless, it is possible to capture nondeterministic system behavior with state-event systems as different events may be enabled in a given state s and their occurrence may result in different successor states. For instance, the random selection of messages from an input buffer by an agent could be captured by modeling the selection of different messages with different events (e.g., by using select a (i) for modeling the selection of the ith message by agent a).
A run of a given system is modeled by a trace, i.e., a sequence of events. As a convention, we use to denote the empty trace, use the operator · to convert events into traces (i.e., e is the trace consisting of a single occurrence of the event e), and use a dot to denote concatenation of traces (i.e., t.t is the trace resulting from the concatenation of the trace t with the trace t ). [29] . This is a simple formalism for specifying a transition relation by defining pre-conditions and post-conditions for the individual events. A PP-statement has the following form:
In the above PP-statement, v i 1 , . . . , v i n denotes the list of variables whose values might change when the event e stat occurs. The values of all other variables remain unchanged. The formulas Φ and Ψ express, respectively, the precondition and post-condition of e stat . In these formulas, we use the names of the variables v 1 , . . . , v n to denote their value in the state before the transition. For denoting the values of variables in the state after the transition, we decorate the names of variables with primes. That is, v i denotes the value of variable v i in the state before the transition caused by e stat and v i denotes the value of variable v i in the state after the transition. A PP-statement only imposes constraints on occurrences of a single event (e.g., the above PP-statement only imposes constraints on occurrences of e stat ). For defining a complete transition relation, one specifies a set of PP-statements.
The formalism of PP-statements has a logical characterization. Semantically, the above PP-statement denotes the following set of state transitions:
This logical characterization reveals that the above PP-statement permits a transition (s, e stat , s ) if and only if the pre-condition Φ holds for the state s, the post-condition Ψ holds for the pair s, s of states, and the values of all variables not mentioned in v i 1 , . . . , v i n remain unchanged by the transition. The condition e stat = e ensures that the PP-statement, indeed, does not impose any constraints on events other than e stat . The transition relation modeled by a set of PP-statements is the intersection of the transition relations modeled by the individual PP-statements.
We used PP-statements already in previous case studies on information flow security and developed basic tool support for simplifying their use in the context of the Verification Support Environment (brief: VSE), an industrialstrength, general-purpose tool for supporting the use of formal methods in large-scale software development [1] . The reader is referred to [30] for a detailed description of how PP-statements are translated into the VSE-SL, the formal specification language of the VSE. While we found it convenient to use PP-statements in our case study, one could use any other specification formalism for specifying labeled transition relations, including process algebras like CSP [13] or CCS [27] . The choice of a specification formalism is only relevant for the functional specification of the various agents and the platform. From Section 3 on, we only refer to the state-event system that is induced by the logical characterization of PP-statements.
Specification of the agents
As mentioned before, we consider two kinds of agents, namely customer agents and merchant agents, in our case study. In the specification of agents, we distinguish between generic aspects that are common to all kinds of agents and agent-specific aspects. The benefit of this distinction is that large parts of our analysis only depend on the generic aspects and, hence, remain valid if one were exchanging agent-specific aspects. An example for a generic aspect is that agents have to be initialized before they start to operate in the virtual mall. We use a variable Run to distinguish these two phases of an agent's behavior where an agent is still in the initialization phase if Run is false (⊥) and, if Run is true ( ), the initialization has been completed and the agent is operating in the virtual mall to fulfill its designated purpose. For modeling the control flow in an agent, we use a variable pc that points to a location in the agent's program, the current point of control. Finally, the function mem models the current values of the agent's program variables. The particular program that the agent is executing and the concrete set of program variables, however, are not generic as they depend on the particular kind of agent.
There are also generic aspects in the behavior of agents. We use the event init a (Mem) for modeling the initialization of program variables in agent a with a function Mem. The completion of the initialization phase for agent a is modeled by the event start a . This event sets the variable Run to true and, afterwards, the agent starts to execute its program. The stepwise execution of the agent's program is modeled by several further events, but these events depend on the particular kind of agent. Common to all kinds of agents is that they exchange messages with other agents (via the platform). We use events of the form send a (b, m) to model that an agent a sends a message m to the platform with the intention that the platform forwards the message to the agent b. Events of the form recv b (a, m) are used to model that agent b receives a message m (originally sent by agent a) from the platform.
More formally, we obtain the following generic specification of agents. 
Definition 3 (Agent-SES
The specification of a concrete agent can be obtained by instantiating the generic specification. To this end, one needs to define two actual parameters, i.e., a set of program variables and a set of internal events. This is the approach that we use for specifying customer agents and merchant agents in the following.
Note that the generic specification in Definition 3 leaves the transition relation (i.e., T ) and the internal aspects of an agent specification (i.e., the local state and the set of internal actions) underspecified. The interface of an agent specification is partially given by constraining the set I to events of the form init, start, and recv events and by constraining the set O to send events.
In Section 4, we decompose a security requirement on the level of generic agent specifications. The internal details of a given agent are only relevant in Section 5 when we analyze the local security requirements resulting for this agent.
Comparison-shopping scenario: specification of customer agents
After a customer agent has received the set of relevant merchants, it contacts these merchants and awaits their offers. Eventually, the customer agent selects, based on the preferences of the agent's owner, one of these offers and buys the goods.
In our specification, we assume that the agent's owner supplies his preferences to the agent during the initialization phase. The variable Preferences is used for storing these preferences. Moreover, we assume that a customer agent is initialized with the set of relevant merchants. This set is stored in the variables RMers and OMers. The remaining program variables are CurMer, Offers, and BestOffer. These variables are used, respectively, for iterating over a set of merchants, for storing the offers received so far, and for storing the offer that has been selected by the agent.
The interface events of a customer agent ca are init ca (Mem), start ca , send ca (b, m), and recv ca (b, m) as specified in Definition 3. For modeling the internal actions, we use events of the form int ca (l, l , Mem) where l and l are pointers into the agent's program (representing the value of the program counter before and after the transition, respectively) and Mem is a mapping from program variables to values (representing the values of program variables before the transition).
After being initialized by the events init ca (Mem) and start ca , the customer agent ca sends a request to each merchant in the set RMers. This first phase is modeled by three steps (1 pc 3): selecting a merchant agent, removing this agent from RMers, and sending the actual request. In a second phase (pc = 4), incoming offers are stored in the variable Offers and the variable OMers is updated for keeping track which relevant merchant agents have not yet submitted an offer. After a timeout, the best offer (according to Preferences) is stored in the variable BestOffer (pc = 6/7) and, in a final phase, a buy request is sent to the merchant who submitted this best offer. The control flow for a customer agent is summarized in Fig. 1 .
More formally, we obtain the following specification of a customer agent. Here, and in the following, we use nil to denote the empty set and ⊥ for undefined values. 
Definition Ex-1 (Specification of a customer agent). Let
• mem 0 (Preferences) = pref ca , and • Int ca and T ca are given by the PP-Statements in Fig. 2 .
Definition Ex-1 is meant as an example for the specification of a customer agent. We need such a concrete specification in order to illustrate the local security analysis for the individual agents in Section 5. As mentioned before, one could refine the specification of customer agents when analyzing a real system. In particular, the buying behavior could be refined according to a well-known model like, for example, the Nicosia model [32] , the Howard-Shet model [15] , the Engel-Kollat-Blackwell (EKB) model [5] , or the Consumer Decision Process Model (CDP) [3] . Our exemplary security analysis of a customer agent could then serve as a guideline for re-doing the local analysis for the refined agent specification.
Comparison-shopping scenario: specification of merchant agents
When a merchant dispatches an agent, he provides his agent with information about the goods to be sold. This would include a description of the goods themselves as well as information about available quantities and prices. In the virtual mall, a merchant agent awaits requests from customers and, if appropriate, replies with offers for the requested goods. A merchant agent also collects the orders for goods that it receives from customers in response to previously sent offers. This set can be used by the merchant agent's owner to deliver the goods as ordered. The variable Catalog is used to store the information about the goods that the merchant agent should sell for its owner. The program variables Requests, Offers, and Contracts are used to store, respectively, the requests received from customers that have not yet been answered, the set of offers made, and the orders received.
The interface events of a merchant agent are init ma (Mem), start ma , send ma (b, m), and recv ma (b, m) as specified in Definition 3. Like for customer agents, we use events of the form int ma (l, l , Mem) for modeling the internal actions.
After being initialized by the events init ma (Mem) and start ma , a merchant agent awaits requests from the customer agents. The merchant agent stores each request that it receives in the set Requests. Once, Requests is non-empty, the merchant agent may decide to send an offer in response. The offer is generated based on the given request and the information in Catalog. All offers made are recorded in Offers. Once Offers is non-empty, the merchant agent also accepts orders that correspond to one of the offers in Offers. After such a buy request has been received, the offer is removed from Offers and the order is stored in Contracts. Fig. 3 summarizes the control flow in a merchant agent.
More formally, we obtain the following specification of a merchant agent:
Definition Ex-2 (Specification of a merchant agent).
Let A m be a set of names for merchant agents. An agent stateevent system SES ma = (E ma , I ma , O ma , S ma , s 0 ma , T ma ) for an agent ma ∈ A m with a set of internal events Int ma and a set of local variables PV ma is a merchant state-event system iff • PV ma = {Catalog, Requests, Contracts, Offers}, Like for customer agents, Definition Ex-2 is meant as an example for the specification of a merchant agent that could be refined when analyzing a real system.
Int ma = ∅
I ma = {init ma (Mem), start ma , recv ma (b, m) | Mem : PV → Val, b ∈ A c , m ∈ M} O ma = {send ma (b, m) | b ∈ A c , m ∈ M} start ma ; affects: Run Pre: Run = ⊥, pc = 1 Post: Run = init ma (initvals); affects: mem, pc Pre: Run = ⊥, pc = 0 Post: pc = 1, mem = initvals, mem (Requests) = nil mem (Offers) = nil mem (Contracts) = nil recv ma (ca, offer_request(p)); affects: mem(Requests) Pre: Run = , pc = 1, ca ∈ A c Post: mem (Requests) = {[ca, p]} ∪ mem(Requests) send ma (ca, o); affects: mem(Requests), mem(Offers) Pre: Run = , pc = 1, (ca, p) ∈ mem(Requests), o = gen_offer(ca, p, mem(Catalog)) Post: mem (Requests) = mem(Requests) \ (ca, p),mem (Offers) = {[ca, o]} ∪ mem(Offers) recv ma (ca, buy(o)); affects: mem(Contracts), mem(Offers) Pre: Run = , pc = 1, [ca, o] ∈ mem(Offers) Post: mem (Contracts) = {[ca, o]} ∪ mem(Contracts), mem (Offers) = mem(Offers) \ [ca, o]• mem 0 (Catalog) = mem 0 (Requests) = mem 0 (Contracts) = mem 0 (Offers) = nil,
Specification of the communication platform
The communication between agents is formalized in a separate component of our specification. The platform buffers any messages that are sent and eventually forwards these messages to the agents that are the intended recipients. There is a separate message buffer buf b for each agent b and the state of the platform is characterized by the contents of these buffers. We use events of the form send a (b, m) to model that an agent a sends a message m to the platform which should forward the message to the intended recipient, agent b. When send a (b, m) occurs, a message m is added to buf b , the message buffer for agent b. Events of the form recv b (a, m) are used to model that the message m (originally sent by a) is forwarded to agent b. Afterwards the message is erased from the buffer. The asynchronous communication between agents prevents senders from being blocked. Note also that send-events are input events for the platform (while being output events for agents) and recv-events are output events of the platform (while being input-events for agents). Our specification assumes the communication via the platform to be reliable in the sense that no messages are lost or filtered and that no spurious messages appear.
Definition 4 (Platform specification).
Let A = A c ∪ A m be a set of names for agents and M be the set of messages. A state-event system SES P = (E P , I P , O P , S P , s 0 P , T P ) is a platform state-event system for A iff
. . , ∅) with ∅ denoting the empty multi-set. Elements of S P are tuples consisting of the buffers for the individual agents in A such that there is a one-to-one relation between an intended buffer in S P and an agent in A. T P is defined by the PP-statements in Fig. 5 with respect to the state variables buf a 1 , . . . , buf a n .
We model the buffers of the agents as multi-sets of messages. This allows an agent to download messages in any arbitrary order. Thus, in the PP-statements of Fig. 5 denotes the union on multi-set and \\ the subtraction on multi-sets. Definition 4 is meant as an example for the specification of a communication platform. One could refine this specification, for instance, to model a Java platform running on a single machine or an implementation of the JACK system [43] distributed on multiple machines.
Specification of the multi-agent systems
Before moving to the next level of complexity in our specification, namely the specification of the entire multiagent system, we simplify the specification of individual agents by abstracting from the internal states of these agents. This results in a specification of agents in terms of their possible traces. The resulting trace-based specifications fit nicely with the system models that are often assumed in the definition of information flow properties (see, for example, [10, 18, 23] ). This facilitates the specification of security requirements in later sections.
Definition 5 (Event system). An event system ES = (E, I, O, Tr)
consists of a set E of events, a set of input events I ⊆ E, a set of output events O ⊆ E and a set of all possible traces Tr ⊆ E * of ES. We require I and O to be disjoint and Tr to be closed under prefixes, i.e., α.β ∈ Tr implies α ∈ Tr.
There is a canonical abstraction from the internal states in state-event systems, i.e., each state-event system induces a unique event system.
Definition 6 (Event system induced by a state-event system). A state-event system SES = (E, I, O, S, s 0 , T ) induces an event system ES SES = (E, I, O, Tr SES ) where Tr SES is defined by
More complex systems can be specified by composing the specifications of their components. In our case study, we exploit this possibility by specifying the entire virtual mall as a composition of the various agents and the platform. The notion of composition for event systems was introduced by McCullough [23] and is similar to the one in process algebras like CSP [13] . Technically, the composed system can engage in any event in which one of its components can engage, whereas one identifies mutually corresponding interface events of the components. For instance, the send-events of the agents are identified with the corresponding send-events of the platform. The components of the composed system interact with each other by synchronizing on the occurrences of shared events. This means, the projection of a trace of the overall system to the set of events of any component must be a possible trace of that component. The projection of a trace τ to a given set of events (denoted by τ | E ) results from τ by deleting all events not in E.
Definition 7 (Composition). Two event systems ES
2 ) are composable iff each communication event is an input event of one component and an output event of the other component, i.e.,
We are now in the position to specify the entire virtual mall as the composition of the respective specifications of customer agents, merchant agents, and the platform. We usually index a composed event system by the set of its agents. If the composed event system includes the platform we add the symbol "+" to the index.
By definition our agents only communicate via the platform. They do not share any events, and, therefore, agents specifications are trivially composable. For a given set X ⊆ A of agent names, the result of the composition x∈X ES x is an event system having the send-events of all agents x ∈ X as output-events. The recv-events, the initialization events, and the start events of all agents form the input events of this composition. The agents and the platform share only send and recv events. Thus, we define:
Definition 8 (Multi-agent system as ES).
Let X ⊆ A be a non-empty set of agents and let ES a be the agent event system for a ∈ X. Let ES P be the event system for the platform. A multi-agent system ES X + = (E X + , I X + , O X + , Tr X + ) with respect to a set of agents X and the platform P is defined by
Given our scenario of customers and merchants we instantiate Definition 8 to obtain the comparison-shopping system: Definition Ex-3 (Event system for comparison shopping). Let ES ma be the event system for a merchant agent ma ∈ A m , let ES ca be the event system for a customer agent ca ∈ A c , and let ES P be the event system for the platform. Then, the event system ES CS + = (E CS + , I CS + , O CS + , Tr CS + ) specifying the virtual mall for the comparison-shopping scenario is defined by
Modeling security requirements
Security requirements originate for multi-agent-based virtual malls, on one hand, from the need to protect an agent's asset (for instance, to keep a piece of information confidential until it has been paid for) and, on the other hand, from the need to establish an environment for trading that is fair, in some sense, for the participants. From the manifold security requirements in such a setting, we select one particular requirement. This security requirement serves as the running example in this article:
Confidentiality of offers:
A merchant agent ma shall not obtain information about the offers made by other merchant agents to any given customer agent ca.
This requirement captures one aspect of fair trading. If some merchants were able to learn about offers made by other merchants then they could exploit this information by incrementally underbidding others' offers immediately after they have been made. Such unfair trading behavior is prevented by the above security requirement. If the requirement is satisfied for a given merchant then neither his merchant agent nor the customer agents to whom his agent has made offers nor the platform can leak information about his offers to other merchants and their agents. That is, confidentiality of offers is a global security requirement involving the overall virtual mall and not only a single agent. In Section 4, we discuss how such global security requirements can be enforced by establishing local guarantees about the individual agents. In the current section, we focus on how this global requirement can be formalized in an unambiguous way.
Confidentiality of offers involves two sets of events. Firstly, there is the set of events modeling that another merchant's agent makes an offer to the given customer agent:
These events involve secrets that shall be kept confidential from ma.
Secondly, there is the set of all events in which ma can engage and whose occurrences he therefore notices or, in other words, the events that are visible to ma:
Obviously, there would be a violation of the given security requirement if some events were both confidential and visible to ma. Fortunately, there are no such events because C Offers ma,ca ∩ V Offers ma = ∅ follows from our definitions. While it is a necessary condition for the given security requirement that this intersection is empty, this condition alone is not sufficient. A merchant's agent might be able to deduce information about occurrences of events from his observations even though he cannot directly see the occurrence of these events. There are other ways for communicating a secret piece of data than transmitting it directly to the recipient. It can be transmitted in encoded form, after fragmenting it, or via intermediaries. Thus, the goal is not merely to prevent an attacker from seeing a secret piece of data, but rather to prevent his observations from depending on the secret. In other words, no information must flow from the secret to the attacker's observations. Numerous properties have been proposed to properly capture the lack of unwanted information flow in various situations. Here, we focus on the class of possibilistic information flow properties. Prominent examples from this class are generalized noninterference [23] , noninference [33] , and separability [24] .
The modular assembly kit for security properties
We employ the Modular Assembly Kit for Security Properties (brief: MAKS) as the conceptual basis for the specification and verification of security requirements in our case study. The MAKS was originally intended as a formal framework for the uniform representation and the comparison of the known possibilistic information flow properties [18] . The framework turned out to also be suitable for a goal-directed derivation of novel information flow properties, of compositionality results, and of unwinding theorems [19] [20] [21] [22] .
In the MAKS, an information flow property is composed of two elements, a set of views and a security predicate. The security predicate is, again, defined in a modular fashion by assembling a non-empty set of so called basic security predicates (hence, the name Modular Assembly Kit), each of which imposes very primitive restrictions on the flow of information.
A view defines the secrets and the observational capabilities of the attacker. This is achieved by identifying the set of all events that introduce secrets into the system and the set of all events whose occurrences are visible to the attacker. As a convention, we denote the set of confidential events by C and the set of visible events by V (possibly with sub-/superscripts and primes). As explained before, the intersection of these sets must be empty. A third set of events arises for a given specification by collecting all the remaining events (denoted by N for non-confidential/non-visible).
Definition 9 (View).
A view V = (V , N, C) in a set of events E is a triple such that V , N , C forms a disjoint partition of E.
Please notice the differences in notation. Throughout the paper we use a caligraphical V to denote views while the standard V refers to visible events within a view V.
We summarize our previous considerations about confidentiality issues with respect to merchants in the following example of a view. Possibilistic information flow security is expressed by the condition that a system's set of possible traces must be closed in some sense. The underlying intuition is that if a given set of traces is "closed" then, for any given observation of an attacker, so many traces could have possibly generated this observation that it is impossible for him to deduce any secret information from his observation. A security predicate is a closure condition that is parametric in a view and that is composed of basic security predicates. A basic security predicate BSP is a (primitive) closure condition of sets of traces that is parametric in a view. For a given view V in E and a set Tr ⊆ E * , BSP V (Tr) holds if and only if the closure condition is satisfied by Tr for V. A security predicate SP is defined by a non-empty set of BSPs, which are conjunctively connected. This means, SP V (Tr) holds if and only if BSP V (Tr) holds for each BSP contained in the set of BSPs that defines SP.
There is already a collection of concrete BSPs for the MAKS. Each of these BSPs can be categorized into one of two dimensions. BSPs from the first dimension perturb a given trace by deleting occurrences of confidential events and thereby ensure that an attacker cannot deduce that a particular confidential event must have occurred. The intuition for a given view (V , N, C) is as follows: If, for each possible trace of the form β. c .α (where α, β ∈ E * and c ∈ C), the trace β.α is also a possible trace of the system then an attacker who observes the sequence (β. c .α)| V cannot tell whether β. c .α or β.α has actually occurred. This implies that he cannot tell that the confidential event c must have occurred. If a system's set of possible traces is closed under such a closure condition for the view of a given attacker then this attacker cannot tell from his observations that a given confidential event has occurred, and, moreover, he cannot tell that any confidential event has occurred at all.
BSPs from the second dimension perturb a trace by inserting occurrences of confidential events and thereby ensure that an attacker cannot deduce that a particular confidential event cannot have occurred. If, for each possible trace of the form β.α, the trace β. c .α is also a possible trace of the system then an attacker who observes the sequence (β.α)| V cannot tell that the confidential event c cannot have occurred.
One can further distinguish the BSPs within each dimension depending on the corrections that are permitted. A BSP is called strict if it requires each perturbation of each possible trace to be a possible trace. One obtains a weaker closure condition by permitting corrections to the perturbed trace. A BSP is called non-strict if it requires that, for each perturbation t of each possible trace τ , there is a possible trace τ that equals t in its occurrences of visible and confidential events. The intuition underlying this softening of the closure requirement is that the possibility of a trace τ is almost as good as the possibility of the trace t for creating uncertainty for the attacker about the confidential events that have actually occurred. There are also BSPs that constrain the positions where a perturbed trace may be corrected. Most prominent are the so called backwards-strict BSPs that permit only causal corrections, i.e., corrections to the right of the position where the perturbation modified the given trace. One advantage of backwards-strict BSPs is that they are capable of ruling out some attacks that the non-strict BSPs fail to detect. 1 The following definition introduces two BSPs, Backwards-Strict Deletion of Confidential Events (brief: BSD) and Backwards-Strict Insertion of Confidential Events (brief: BSI), in full detail. For the formal definition of further BSPs and their characteristics, we refer the reader to [16, 18, [20] [21] [22] .
Definition 11 (BSD and BSI). Let ES = (E, I
, O, Tr) be an event system and let V = (V , N, C) be a view in E.
Note that, if BSD V (Tr) holds then, for any trace t that results from a possible trace τ by deleting the last occurrence of a confidential event, there is some possible trace τ that differs from t only in occurrences of events from N and these differences only occur to the right of the position where the occurrence of the confidential event has been deleted. If BSI V (Tr) holds then, for any trace t that results from a possible trace τ by inserting an occurrence of a confidential event at a position where no confidential events occur to the right, there is some possible trace τ that differs from t only in occurrences of events from N and these differences only occur to the right of the position where the occurrence of the confidential event has been inserted.
While we focus on a single information flow property in our case study, one gains several benefits from using this more general framework. Firstly, this allows us to re-use already existing compositionality results and unwinding theorems in our security analysis. Secondly, the MAKS cleanly separates the definition of a security policy, which is captured in a so called view, from the definition of an information flow property. We use the notion of views as the basis for the second step in our two-step decomposition methodology. Finally, one aim of our case study is to provide a guideline for future information flow analyses of other multi-agent systems. We expect the use of MAKS to be helpful in finding and defining suitable information flow properties, which might differ from the one used in our case study. Once the security requirement has been specified in the MAKS, the security analysis can be carried out along the same lines as in our exemplary analysis while benefiting from existing compositionality results and unwinding theorems.
Formalizing security requirements in the case study
We are now in the position to illustrate the specification of security requirements of multi-agent systems more concretely. To this end, we complete the specification of the security requirement discussed already at the beginning of this section:
Confidentiality of offers (refined):
No merchant agent ma shall be able to deduce from his observations any information about the offers that have been made by other merchant agents to a given customer agent ca. By applying this construction for each pair consisting of a merchant agent ma and a customer agent ca, we obtain the following set of views:
Our example requirement demands that a merchant agent must not be capable of deducing from his observations that another merchant must have made a particular offer. Therefore, we have to employ a BSP from the first dimension. Among the various possible BSPs in the first dimension, we select BSD. We could also have chosen a non-strict BSP instead and the analyses could be performed along the same lines as in Sections 4 and 5 (e.g., for the BSP R that perturbs a given trace by removing all occurrences of confidential events at once and that permits corrections at arbitrary positions). In comparison to using a non-strict BSP, using a backwards-strict BSP has the aforementioned advantage of detecting some subtle attacks and, moreover, showing BSD for the system is a strong result as BSD V (Tr) implies R V (Tr) [22] . If the security requirement were that the attacker must not be capable of deducing that a particular offer cannot have been made by another merchant then one would use a BSP from the second dimension instead of, or in addition to, the BSP from the first dimension. However, this is not necessary for our example requirement.
The following definition summarizes our specification of the security requirement.
Definition Ex-4 (Confidentiality of offers). We say that the virtual mall satisfies confidentiality of offers if and only if BSD V (Tr CS + ) holds for each V ∈ VS
Offers .
Decomposition methodology
As mentioned before, many security requirements are global properties of the entire system. In particular, our example secrecy requirement cannot be enforced by a single agent in any sensible way. The offer of a merchant ma can only remain confidential for another merchant ma = ma if the offer is not leaked to ma by ma itself and if it is not leaked by any other agent that receives ma's offer. Instead of approaching the security analysis of the entire multi-agent system as one big monolithic task, it is good practice to split up this task into smaller ones: analyzing agents individually and afterwards combining the analysis results. As usual, this helps us in reducing the complexity when analyzing larger systems and, hereby, contributes to making the approach scale up.
Additionally, we want to characterize the contributions of individual participants to the overall security property without referring to any unnecessary details of these agents. For instance, we want to leave underspecified how this contribution will be implemented in the end. This means that we have to formulate properties of single agents such that the satisfaction of these properties guarantee the global security property. The properties that we end up with are again confidentiality properties, similar to the ones for the whole system, except that they only concern individual agents of the platform.
In other words, we deal (a) with properties of single agents, (b) with properties of the whole system, and (c) with the relationship between both. This leaves us with several questions:
• What requirements do we formulate for individual agents and for the platform such that the fulfillment of these requirements guarantee the global property? This is a design question.
• Which agents can we assume to respect the requirements that we assume them to respect? This is a question of trust in, or of control over, agents.
• How can we establish that properties of single agents compose to the global property that we require? This is a question of compositionality of our security properties.
We will discuss these issues in reverse order in the rest of this section. The resulting decomposition theorem is similar to the one in [38] , where, however, confidentiality requirements, assumptions about the platform, and conditions on the single agents are different. The theorem is derived using the strategy described in [38] .
Compositionality of security properties
Let us assume that, both the agents and the platform in a multi-agent system, satisfy some security property. The question arises whether we can conclude from this assumption that the composed system also satisfies some security property.
The framework that we use as the conceptual basis for expressing and verifying confidentiality properties in this case study provides compositionality results for some of the basic security predicates. In particular, there are results for the basic security predicate BSD that we have used to formulate the overall security property. The following theorem, which is the part of Theorem 3 from [21] concerned with BSD, states that if certain conditions are met concerning the relationship between, for instance, the views V 1 , V 2 , and the global security view V then the local security properties imply a global security property.
Theorem 12 (Compositionality [21]). Let ES i = (E i , I i , O i , Tr i ) (for i = 1, 2) and ES = (E, I, O, Tr) = ES 1 ES 2 be event systems. Let V i = (V i , N i , C i ) (for i = 1, 2) and V = (V , N, C) be views over E i and E, resp., such that
Our intention is to employ the theorem backwards: given a global security property for the whole multi-agent system, how can we "invent" local security properties for the individual agents such that they compose to the global security property? Answering this question is often non-trivial, in particular, as one also needs to respect requirements that are not concerned with security. For instance, ma 's offer will remain confidential for ma if ma does not send any offers to other agents at all. From the viewpoint of secrecy, this would be a viable solution. However, when one takes other requirements into account, it becomes clear how ridiculous the solution is. It would effectively preclude merchants from trading in the virtual mall. Another extreme solution would be to let a merchant ma freely send his offers to all agents except ma. In this case, one would need to trust all agents to not leak offers to ma. This is not acceptable either, unless one were willing to trust all agents on the platform to preserve the confidentiality of the given offers. Therefore, some other solution for decomposing the global security requirement is required. In the following, we derive a decomposition of our example requirement. We also provide more general remarks on how to decompose such global security requirements. This shall facilitate using our exemplary security analysis as a guideline for analyzing other multi-agent systems.
Decomposition of security properties
We are interested in global security properties of multi-agent system demanding that some secret is kept confidential from a set Ω of agents. We call these agents observers and formalize the secret as a set of events C that have to be kept secret from the observers. Observers can only monitor their own events E Ω while all other events are non-visible. This gives rise to the following notion of global security views:
Definition 13 (Global security view).
Let Ω ⊆ A be a set of agents and C ⊆ E A\Ω be a set of events. Then, a global security view
) with respect to Ω and C is defined by
Instantiating the basic security predicate BSD with a global security view formalizes the property that no observer in Ω can deduce anything about the occurrence of an event in C.
Consider, for instance, the views V The basic security property BSD using the view V Offers ma,ca ensures that a merchant ma can not deduce that any other merchant has sent an offer to a customer ca.
Instead of proving directly a global security property of the entire system, our goal is to design individual local security properties that compose to the requested global security property and that allow us to realize the functionality that we originally wanted to achieve by the system. We will do this in several steps. Each of the steps will provide a definition of properties that are sufficient conditions for the preceding properties to hold. At the end we obtain a decomposition theorem (Theorem 20) which assures us that the requested global security property follows from the local security properties for a subset of the individual agents provided that certain assumptions about these properties hold. The development of this decomposition theorem also serves as a guideline for how to find the appropriate subset of agents and their respective security requirements.
Separating friends and observers
The first step in our decomposition methodology is concerned with the categorization of agents into friends and observers. This results in two disjoint sets of agents, a set Φ of friends and a set Ω of observers (i.e., A = Φ Ω). Trusted agents that need to know the secret have to be categorized as friends. Agents that we do not trust or that we cannot control must not obtain the secret. These agents have to be categorized as observers. Each of the remaining agents can be freely placed in either category. As the security requirement is trivially fulfilled for the subsystem of observers, the larger Ω can sensibly be, the better. However, the larger the set Ω is the stronger the constraints are for the subsystem of friends because friends must not exchange confidential events with observers. In particular, one might not be able to complete the security analysis if one chooses a too large set Ω.
The following lemma exemplifies that one strengthens the security property by placing more agents into the observers category: 
Proof. This lemma is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 in [21] 2 using the fact that
V g[Ω ,C] ⊆ V g[Ω,C] and C g[Ω ,C] ⊆ C g[Ω,C] holds. 2
Consider a view V
Offers ma,ca representing that merchant ma should not learn the offers of other merchants sent to a customer ca. Thus, ma constitutes an observer. Other merchants send offers to ca, but no other customer agent really needs to know about these offers for the protocol to work. Therefore all customers different from ca are considered also as observers. Note that the set of confidential events includes the transmission of all offers that ca receives from any merchant different from ma. Therefore, no other merchant (potentially sending a confidential offer to ca) can be considered as an observer together with ma. Hence, in the example, we choose Ω = (A c \ {ca}) ∪ {ma}.
The classification of agents into observers and friends allows us to split the multi-agent system into two separate subsystems (cf. Fig. 6 ):
• The system ES Φ + consists of the platform and all friends Φ: we require that this subsystem keeps the secrets confidential for a fictitious observer that can see the complete interface of the subsystem (i.e., all messages entering or leaving the subsystem via the platform). This is defined in Definition 15.
• The system ES Ω consists of all observers Ω: agents in Ω can observe the other system via their interfaces, and since we assume that the secret is kept secret from their interfaces using ES Φ + , we actually do not need to require anything from the observers.
Accordingly, in the following we define a view V fr [Φ,C] for ES Φ + that ensures that no secret is leaked inspecting its interface to the outside. This interface consists of the communication lines between the platform and the observers of the original system. Thus, C is again the set of confidential events, the set of visible events are all events of the system to the outside, i.e., all events originally denoting messages between platform and observer. All other events are considered as being non-visible. ] ) over E Φ + with respect to Φ and C is defined by 
Definition 15 (Security view for friends). Let Φ ⊆ A, and let C ⊆ E Φ . Then the security view for friends
In our comparison-shopping scenario, this means for a given choice of ma and ca that we do not need to inspect the behavior of the merchant agent ma or any of the customer agents different from ca, since they are not even involved in the definition of ES Φ + . This will simplify our remaining part of the design and verification task considerably.
Imposing constraints on friends
In a next step we will decompose the security requirement for ES Φ + into local security requirements for individual agents in Φ such that the original requirement is enforced. The idea here is to mentally divide each friend, as it were, into a confidential part that 'deals with the secret', and a public part that does not. Each agent itself now needs to satisfy the property that prevents it from leaking the secret from the confidential part to the public part. Additionally, all friends need to agree not to leak the secret from their confidential part to the public part of another friend. This will be ensured by side conditions that require the platform to appropriately match a send-event and its corresponding receive-event: incoming public messages will be forwarded as public ones and also all delivered public messages are already received as being public. In this case we can prove the following lemma stating that the platform will not leak information:
Proof. We sketch a direct proof of this lemma because the platform's specification is intentionally extremely simple and we are mainly interested in the agents after all. However, a proof using techniques described in Section 5 is also possible.
According to Definition 11, it is sufficient to show that β.α ∈ Tr P for all sequences of events α, β ∈ E * P under the assumptions β. c .α ∈ Tr P , α| C P = , and c ∈ C P .
First note that each send-event is always enabled, and that each The following definition formalizes the necessary conditions on the behavior of friends that allow us to decompose the security view for all friends into individual views for each friend: All messages to the outside are public, corresponding send-and receive-events between friends are either both classified or both visible, messages of friends to the platform are either classified or visible (but not non-visible) and global secrets C are considered confidential by all friends.
Definition 18 (C-preserving individual views). Let
The following lemma guarantees the soundness of considering BSD with respect to the individual views of the friends instead of proving BSD with respect to the more complex friends' system view.
Lemma 19. Let Φ ⊆ A and C ⊆ E Φ . If a family (V) a∈Φ of views is C-preserving and BSD V a (Tr a ) holds for all
Proof. We proceed in two steps. For arbitrary sets X ⊆ Φ, let the auxiliary view V X = (V X , N X , C X ) over E X + be defined by
V X comprises the events of all friends in X and the events of the platform that include, in particular, also send and recv events of the platform to all other agents in A.
(1) For any X ⊆ Φ, BSD V a (Tr a ) for all a ∈ X implies BSD V X (Tr X + ): Proof by induction on the size of X.
(a) Base case X = ∅: therefore, where BSD V X (Tr X + ) follows from the induction hypothesis. The applicability conditions for the theorem are easily checked:
The conditions for visible and confidential events follow directly from (1), for the conditions for N -events, condition (3) of Definition 18 is crucial. It implies that no event in E P is an N -event, and therefore events in N a cannot be members of any other set E X + or N X unless a ∈ X, which would contradict the assumption of the step case. Similarly, any event in N X is in N a for some a = a , and E a and E a are disjoint. = C there is an agent a ∈ Φ such that e ∈ E a . Since C ∩ E a ⊆ C a , we have e ∈ C a and thus e ∈ C Φ as required.
By transitivity, from (1) for X = Φ and (2) we conclude the conjecture. 2
Overall decomposition
Starting with a global system view and dividing the set of agents into friends and observers we finally arrived at individual views of friends. Proving BSD with respect to these individual views will guarantee that BSD of the overall system holds. The following theorem formalizes this property.
Theorem 20 (Overall decomposition). Let A = Φ Ω, v ∈ Ω and C ⊆ E Φ . If a family (V) a∈Φ of views is Cpreserving and BSD V a (Tr a ) holds for all
Theorem 20 follows directly from Lemmas 14, 16, and 19. The given procedure is a recipe which does not, by any means, fix the requirements of an individual agent, but it considerably cuts down the design search space by providing rules-of-thumb reasoning, the outcome of which can then directly be checked for correctness.
Theorem 20 only deals with BSD, as this is the only security property that was needed for the accompanying case study. This is not a restriction of the decomposition recipe, however, and similar theorems can be provided for other basic security predicates. For example, [38] and [39] provide a similar theorem based on the same procedure for BSD and BSIA. Differences in technical detail are due to the fact that BSIA is parametrized by a filter function, which needs to be accounted for by additional conditions, and that compositionality of BSIA presupposes BSD. For more details the interested reader is referred to [38] .
Decomposition for comparison shopping
According to our requirements formulated in Section 3.2, we consider the customer ca receiving offers and all merchants ma = ma that want to keep their offers to ca confidential from ma as friends. The merchant ma and all other customers are observers. Hence to verify the security property BSD with respect to a view V Offers ma,ca ∈ VS Offers , the only agents that need to be analyzed in detail are the customer agent ca and all merchant agents ma different from ma. However, since all other merchants ma behave uniformly we can treat them uniformly. So we choose views V ca ma,ca for the customer ca and V ma ma,ca for a merchant ma such that BSD holds with respect to both views and Theorem 20 will be applicable. The views are presented in the following definition:
Definition Ex-5 (Local views). Let ma be a merchant agent (the observer) and ca be an arbitrary customer agent. = {send ma (ca, o), recv ma (ca, buy(o) 
We delay the proofs that BSD holds with respect to these views till the next section and discuss now the applicability of Theorem 20 instantiating v by ma and C by C Offers ma,ca . As mentioned before Φ is the set {ca} ∪ (A m \ {ma}) . In detail, we have to show that v = ma ∈ A \ Φ, C ⊆ E Φ (this holds because both ca and ma = ma are friends), and that (V a ) a∈Φ is C-preserving. We sketch the conditions from Definition 18:
(1) For all a ∈ Φ, V a ma,ca includes all send-and receive-events except some events between the friends ca and some ma . (2) No send-or receive-event is in the N -events for any local view, the sets C ma ma,ca and C ma ma,ca are symmetric such that (a) corresponding send-and receive-events are both confidential, and thus (b) all other send-and receive-events are visible. (3) The only N -events are internal events, and none of these is ever an event of the platform. This means that the theorem is applicable and the choices are suitable as far as the decomposition is concerned. The following section shows that the choices are also suitable insofar as the specifications given in Section 2 actually satisfy the corresponding security properties.
Agent verification
By applying our decomposition methodology, we reduced the problem of verifying the global security requirement BSD V g[{v},C] (Tr A + ) for the entire multi-agent system to the problem of verifying the corresponding security requirements BSD V a (Tr a ) for all friends a ∈ Φ. One could attempt to verify directly the local requirements for each system component. This would involve showing that the set of possible traces of the given component is closed as prescribed by the definition of BSD and the specification of the view V a . Such proofs usually follow a common pattern, which includes an inductive argument over the length of traces. Unwinding is a proof technique for these properties that reduces the closure condition on sets of traces to several conditions on local transitions, the unwinding conditions. An unwinding theorem ensures that the set of unwinding conditions implies the given closure property. The inductive argument is done once and for all in the proof of the unwinding theorem. Applying the unwinding technique often eases the prove of an information flow property considerably.
MAKS provides unwinding conditions and unwinding theorems for each basic security predicate [19, 22] . Proving a security predicate assembled from several basic security predicates is simply done by proving the unwinding conditions for each of the respective BSPs.
A proof by unwinding is done directly on the level of a state-event system (e.g., a customer state-event system or a merchant state-event system) and not on the level of the induced event system, on which we focused when defining the security requirements in the preceding section. Verification by unwinding can be divided into the following subtasks.
• Firstly, one chooses an unwinding relation , which is a binary relation on states. Intuitively, the aim of defining an unwinding relation is to establish an ordering on states such that if s s holds for two states s and s then every observation that can be made starting in s is also a possible observation starting in s . Hence, the observer looking at the system in state s cannot exclude from his observations the possibility that the system might be in state s . 4 • Secondly, one proves each unwinding condition resulting for the given unwinding relation and the basic security predicates under consideration.
• Finally, one applies the unwinding theorem for the given BSPs in order to deduce the security predicate.
Before we start the verification by unwinding, we give a brief introduction to the unwinding theorem that we apply for proving BSD V a (Tr a ).
Output step consistency (osc) is an unwinding condition that occurs as a precondition in the unwinding theorem for each basic security predicate in MAKS. The purpose of osc is to capture the intuition of the unwinding relation: if s 1 s 1 and the system is in state s 1 then the observer should not be able to exclude from his observations the possibility that the system might be in state s 1 
Definition 21 (Unwinding condition osc). Let SES = (E, I
, O, S, s 0 , T ) be a state-event system, ⊆ S × S and V = (V , N, C) be a view in E. Then the unwinding condition osc with respect to SES and V is given by
Locally-respects forwards (lrf ) is an unwinding condition specific to BSD. BSD requires that deleting a confidential event c from a possible trace yields another possible trace causing the same low-level observations. Corrections of non-visible events after the deleted confidential event are allowed. This intuition can be captured by demanding that the state after the occurrence of c must be in relation with the state before that occurrence since all observations possible after the occurrence of c must still be possible if the occurrence of c were deleted.
Definition 22 (Unwinding condition lrf ). Let SES = (E, I
, O, S, s 0 , T ) be a state-event system, ⊆ S × S, and V = (V , N, C) be a view in E. The unwinding condition lrf (locally-respects forwards) with respect to SES and V is given by:
The following unwinding theorem states that if these two unwinding conditions hold for some state-event system then BSD holds for the corresponding event systems. A proof of this theorem can be found in [22] . [19, 22] ). Let SES = (E, I, O, S, s 0 , T ) be a state event system, ES = (E, I, O, Tr) be the corresponding event system, and ⊆ S × S. Then,
Theorem 23 (Unwinding theorem
(lrf V (T , ) ∧ osc V (T , )) implies BSD V (Tr).
Speculating unwinding relations
The speculation of an appropriate unwinding relation is a creative process that usually requires detailed knowledge about the system specification. On a more general level, one can make two observations. Firstly, in order to fulfill the requirements of lrf , the relation has to relate the states s and s if s is a successor state of s with respect to a confidential event. This suggests choosing a large unwinding relation. Secondly, the more states relates, the weaker the preconditions are that one can use to prove osc. This suggests choosing a small unwinding relation. This conflict contributes to the difficulty of finding a suitable unwinding relation.
Comparison-shopping scenario: unwinding relation for customer agents
Consider the customer in the phase of requesting offers from merchants. Within this phase there are no confidential events and hence, differentiates between all the different incoming offers. Two states are only in relation if they agree in the values of RMers and CurMer. When collecting confidential offers, identifies all states that differ only in secret offers (which are all offers not sent by ma). This consideration results in the following unwinding relation for the customer:
Definition Ex-6 (Unwinding relation for customer). Let ca ∈ A c be a customer and ma ∈ A m be a merchant. The unwinding relation for ca with respect to ma is defined by:
Comparison-shopping scenario: unwinding relation for merchant agents
We are left with the speculation of an appropriate unwinding relation for a merchant ma . In this case all information about offers, requests, and contracts concerning our friend ca are confidential. Thus we basically identify (with respect to ) all states which are equal if we ignore this confidential information. Formally we describe the unwinding relation for the merchant ma as follows.
Definition Ex-7 (Unwinding relation for merchant).
Let ma ∈ A m be a merchant and ca ∈ A c be a customer. The unwinding relation for BSD of ma with respect to ca is defined by:
where del(ca, x) removes all tuples of the form (ca, x) from a set.
Verifying unwinding conditions and the entire multi-agent system
Finally, we verify the unwinding conditions for each instantiation with the view and the unwinding relation for a friend in the following lemmas. Given the result of Theorem Ex-12 we have verified that BSD holds for the customer ca and arbitrary merchants ma who are not identical to the observer ma. Since all friends satisfy BSD, and the family of views is C-preserving (as shown at the end of Section 4) we conclude that the system ES Φ + of friends satisfy BSD (according to Lemma 19) . Therefore, also the overall system satisfies BSD (according to Lemma 16) . Hence, the system as specified in Section 2 satisfies the global security property as described in Section 3 by combining the results for the local security properties of the individual friends with the results from the decomposition methodology.
Theorem Ex-13 (Security of the virtual mall). The virtual mall ES CS + (as specified in Definition
Ex-3) satisfies confidentiality of offers (as specified in Definition Ex-4).
Note that we have chosen the security requirement confidentiality of offers as an example for illustrating our approach to the security analysis of multi-agent systems. By no means do we intend to imply with this choice that this requirement captured security of the virtual mall completely, i.e., there are other requirements that are relevant in our virtual mall (see the examples given in the introduction), nor that it were universal, i.e., one can easily imagine virtual malls where this requirement does not apply. Our case study can be used as a guideline when analyzing other security requirement as one of the authors illustrated in [39] .
We indicated definitions and lemmata that are specific for our case study of comparison shopping by labeling them with Ex−. Changing the case study would result in a change of exactly these parts of our work: First, all participating agents have to be specified with the help of PP-statements. Second, security requirements have to be formulated in terms of basic security predicates. Third, in order to apply the decomposition method the set of agents has to be divided into friends and observers such that the family of views of all friends is C-preserving. Finally, the unwinding relations of the friends have to be specified and verified.
Towards a mechanization of the verification task
In this paragraph we will sketch aspects of automating the verification of unwinding conditions. First, we discuss the translation of the problem specification (consisting of PP-statements, the unwinding relation and the corresponding unwinding condition) into a (first-order) logic. Second, we propose some general tactics guiding a tactical theorem prover in verifying or at least in simplifying the proposed unwinding conditions. These tactics arise on the one hand from doing these proofs (like the proofs of Lemmas Ex-8, Ex-9, Ex-10, and Ex-11 shown in Appendix A) by hand and extracting their regularities into common tactics and on the other hand from carrying forward existing tactics developed for the verification of invariants of state-transition systems [17] . However, we would like to emphasize that this process of refining and evaluating the tactics is still under development and lies outside the scope of this paper.
The formalization of the lemmata require the logical representations of the transition relation of the agent (including the operations used within the transition table, like for instance ∈, select, or \), the reachability property, and the unwinding relation. As mentioned in Section 2, PP-statements can be translated into first-order formulas together with appropriate induction schemes. For instance [30] presents a translation of PP-statements into the input language of the Verification Support Environment System VSE which supports first-order logic with induction. Reachability is a recursively defined predicate based on the definition of the transition table. Finally, the unwinding relations as given in this section are again first-order formulas. This allows us to formulate the proof obligations in a first-order language enriched with means to specify generated algebraic data-types. The idea is to feed these problems into an inductive theorem prover to obtain considerable support for verification. However, due to the size and complexity of the arising proof obligations it is rather unlikely that a prover will automatically find these proofs based on its standard settings; we therefore have to provide appropriate tactics to guide the proof. The proofs of the unwinding conditions follow a regular pattern that can be used to formulate corresponding tactics. In the following we will sketch such common proof patterns when verifying lrf .
The first step in such proofs is usually a case analysis on c ∈ C. In each case we unfold the definition of T which results in formulas relating v 1 , . . . , v n to v 1 , . . . , v n . For instance, for all variables v i which are not mentioned in the affects-slot we know that v i = v i holds. In many other cases the post-conditions specify that v i = f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) for some function f . Hence, we can rewrite the occurrences of most primed variables by terms containing only nonprimed variables and try to unfold non-recursive definitions. Doing such preprocessing in this case study would result in proof obligations that are instances of inductive properties of finite-multi-set operations. A typical example is that an element of the set of offers is still in the offers if we add a new offer. Inductive theorem proving techniques in general [2] and generalization techniques (also presented in [2] ) in particular might help to tackle these remaining inductive problems.
Verifying osc is far more difficult since we have to prove an existentially quantified formula:
Typically, the first step is a case analysis on e ∈ E \ C which allows us to unfold the definition of T (s 1 , e, s 2 ). The next step is the speculation of an appropriate instance of δ. The selection of δ depends on the value of pc which causes an additional case analysis on possible values of pc. In our case study, δ could be selected by inspecting the values of pc since each event is unique with respect to the pre-and postconditions on pc (and Run). Once δ is fixed, we could unfold the definition of T using the PP-statements and use (analogous to the proof of lrf ) the resulting equations v i = f (. . .) to demodulate the theorem. In our case study, we would be left with general inductive properties of functions used in this case study. Obviously, the success of these tactics depends on the way PP-statements are formulated. In our case study, postconditions of the form v i = f (. . .) (v i does not occur in f (. . .)) would allow us to simplify the theorem by rewriting. Analyzing the (human) proofs of the unwinding conditions revealed regularities which could be utilized for guiding a tactical theorem prover. This is a first step towards the mechanization of verifying unwinding conditions which constitutes a major burden when proving the security of the multi-agent system.
Related work
Several approaches to securing multi-agent systems against various threats have been presented in the literature. However, most of these approaches focus on proposing concrete mechanisms for protecting agents and platforms instead of implementing and verifying more abstract, mechanism-independent formal security policies as we have done it in this article. Research on concrete security mechanisms for multi-agent systems can be divided into two different categories, firstly the protection of the platform from malicious agents and secondly the protection of agents from a malicious platform. Some approaches, however, have components which can be used for protection in both directions.
An example for protection of the platform against agents is Signed Code, Verified Code or Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [28, 31] . The code of an agent is equipped with a certificate of its owner or a proof that the code does not exhibit malicious behavior in order to enhance the trust in the code to be executed. Safe Interpreters and Sandboxing [28] are approaches in which the platform executes the code of each agent in a separate environment such that the effect of critical operations can be restricted. In the authentication and state appraisal technique [7] the agent is checked before its execution in order to determine which resources should be granted by the platform and to detect potential modifications of the code.
Protecting agents from malicious platforms is more difficult since a platform necessarily needs to have access to the agent's code and control state in order to execute it. One idea is to attach (cryptographic) information about the execution to the agent such that potential tampering of a malicious platform can be detected afterwards [26, 44, 46] . Other approaches aim at obfuscating the agent's code [14] or computing encrypted functions [41] such that the platform cannot find out what the agent is supposed to do and thus cannot manipulate it on purpose. For a more detailed review of general security mechanisms for multi-agent systems the reader is referred to [37] .
Halpern and O'Neill [11, 12] define various notions of secrecy for multi-agent systems by employing modal logic. Like ours, their definitions are counterfactual ones: there is no information flow from A j to A i if all states of A j are compatible with all states of A i . Similar less restrictive properties are defined and compared. Also, a modal logic is introduced such that the semantic definition of secrecy corresponds to the validity of a set of formulas in the logiceach one representing the proposition 'agent A i does not know φ' for all φ from a semantically characterized set of formulas. Halpern and O'Neill deal with the specification of secrecy and the relationship between different definitions. However, they are not concerned with explicit ways to verify that an multi-agent system actually satisfies a concrete definition of secrecy. Also, techniques for modular reasoning about secrecy and for decomposing secrecy requirements are not addressed.
Subrahmanian et al. [36] develop a notion of confidentiality for heterogeneous agent systems in terms of violated secrets. A secret fact is deemed violated if an observer knows it after communicating with an agent but did not know it before. What each observer knows, i.e. can deduce from the communications with agents, is modeled using a consequence relation, and thus the strength of the notion of confidentiality can be adjusted by choosing a weak or strong consequence relation. On the other hand, the relevant channels over which secrets could be leaked in a given system need to be encoded faithfully into the observer's consequence relation. The authors note that this is difficult in practice and provide a technique to safely approximate the set of secrets known to the observer. The technique classifies all facts that are not causally related to an communication between agent and observer as violated erroneously. It is thus necessary to determine whether there is a causal relationship between communication and secret for the approximation techniques to be applicable. Since the notion of violated secrets is a property of one agent no decomposition of the property is necessary.
Conclusions
This article has proposed a methodology to decompose security requirements for a multi-agent system into local security requirements for individual agents and to use unwinding techniques to verify that an agent's specification satisfies these requirements. Although we developed this methodology within the implementation of the presented case study in the first place, we feel confident that this methodology is also applicable to other scenarios. Modeling agents and platform as (infinite) state-event systems allows us to model various programming paradigms for agents. The decomposition methodology can be extended to cope with other basic security predicates or to cope with other ways of message passing between agents [38] . Ref. [16] , for instance, illustrates how to incorporate the use of encrypted messages into the underlying framework.
The second contribution of this paper is the case study on comparison shopping. In [37] we investigated the security of various versions of comparison shopping. We used one of these versions to instantiate and illustrate our decomposition methodology: first, we specify customer and merchants using a first-order logic. Given the global security requirement of the multi-agent system we decompose the set of agents into friends and observers which allows us to formulate sufficient local security requirements for friends. Using unwinding techniques we prove that the specification of the agents guarantees the corresponding unwinding relations. The invention of appropriate unwinding relations is an error-prone task. Inspection of failed proofs typically reveals information on how to modify the unwinding relation. Since changes in the specification invalidates the proofs already done, an efficient change management (cf. [40] ) is indispensable for maintaining open proof problems and adjusting old invalidated proofs to the new settings.
The investigation of further security requirements in the example scenario has revealed a need for a treatment of declassification. Buy-requests necessarily reveal some information about a secret (for instance, the customer's budget) to the merchant and, hence, they constitute a declassification operation. In the presence of declassification, one can capture requirements with so called intransitive policies and with information flow properties that can deal with such policies. An extension of MAKS provides these capabilities [20] , but in order to extend our analysis method to these information flow properties, we will have to develop corresponding compositionality results first.
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